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This thesis looks at the determinant factors to the Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
location choice of Chinese firms, in particular, the location preference between the 
Singapore market and the market in Hong Kong or in mainland China. 
We find that firms with better financial performance or better corporate governance 
prefer to have IPOs in Singapore other than Chinese domestic markets to separate 
themselves from the rest as a quality signal to the capital markets and also to the 
product markets. However, the findings on the effects of financial performance on the 
choice between Singapore and Hong Kong are contrary with our expectations. Two 
potential explanations are proposed for future study.  
Industry sector, tax burden and firm size are also firms’ consideration to some extent. 
The external effects of a stock market’s performance seem not significant. Lastly, all 
of the testable variables fail to explain the location choice on Catalist (the NASDAQ-
type exchange). 
Firms’ financial performances after IPOs are also examined, providing us information 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2000, Chinese companies1 have increasingly listed their equities outside 
mainland China as an alternative to Chinese comparatively less developed or efficient 
domestic stock exchanges2, or as a way to raise the firms’ international reputation in 
the globalized economy. 
In September 2006, world’s largest initial public offering ever happened in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai with more than US$19 billion being raised. The eye catching 
entity is China’s mega-lender and biggest mainland bank, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). After going public, ICBC has embraced 
remarkable growth which enables it to be recognized as world’s largest bank in terms 
of market capitalization followed by Bank of American. Not only do these giant state-
owned firms from China make news in stock market, but also private firms. 
Alibaba.com raised US$1.5 billion in November 2007 from Hong Kong stock 
exchange (HKEx), world’s largest high tech offering since Google’s offering in 2004. 
Another high tech company Baidu.com soared more than 250% on the day of offering 
in August 2005 at Nasdaq.  
According to a report by Ernest & Young (2009), 2008 was the worst year for IPO 
activity since 2001, with 61% drop in deal numbers and 67% drop in capital raised 
 
1 Unless otherwise stated, throughout this thesis, Chinese firms/companies refer to firms originally 
from mainland China, Hong Kong SAR excluded. 
2 Unless otherwise stated, throughout this thesis, Chinese domestic markets/exchanges refer to stock 
exchanges in mainland China, i.e. Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE). 
from the year before due to market turmoil. Under this condition, China3 accounts for 
the most deals overall and 4 of the 20 largest IPOs. The global second largest IPO of 
the year was the US$5.7 billion offering of China Railway Construction Corp. on 
Shanghai and Hong Kong, after Visa Inc. 
With increasing activities of going overseas by Chinese companies and acceptance 
from the world, it is interesting and meaningful to investigate the determinant factors 
of their IPO location choices, to provide guidance for firms to consider and assess the 
suitability and methods of overseas listing to increase firm value. 
Meanwhile, global investors now are eager to accessing the emerging markets to 
catch the train of rapid growth in the emerging markets, but facing barriers against 
their intentions of investing in those markets, such as China who stepped on the way 
of opening up its financial markets not until recently. China’s domestic stock market, 
known as where A Shares are issued and traded, is inaccessible for foreign investors 
and capital. Only since the late 2002, through the Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor (QFII) program, can foreign investors get access to China’s stock market 
directly although they still face strict restrictions. By the end of 2008, 76 foreign 
institutions have been approved to participate in China’s stock markets, 24 of which 
were approved in 2008. Barriers could also be imposed by regulations from the 
foreign investor’s domicile country, such as restrictions on investment activities in 
emerging markets imposed on some pension funds.  
                                                 
3 In Ernest & Young (2009), “China” includes both mainland China and Hong Kong SAR. 
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Thus, to meet global investors’ desires of accessing to the rapid growth of Chinese 
economy and to seize the opportunity of providing services to the great capital 
demands of Chinese companies, international exchanges are actively encouraging 
Chinese companies to list on them. Study on firms’ decision of listing location will 
also provide useful information to stock exchanges about suitable strategies to 
increase their attractiveness. 
Our focus will be on one of the most popular places for Chinese companies’ public 
offerings, Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). Table 1 shows the distribution of IPOs 
from China since 2001 till the end of 2008, and the percentage of the contribution of 
one market to the total number of IPOs in the three markets (Singapore, Hong Kong 
and mainland China). According to the table, the popularity of SGX in terms of 
number of IPOs is increasing and even outweighing that of HKEx. 
Table 1  Distribution of IPOs4 by listing year 
SG CH HK Total 
Year N  % N % N %  N  
2001 4 4.76 69 82.14 11 13.10 84 
2002 1 1.18 68 80.00 16 18.82 85 
2003 11 11.46 65 67.71 20 20.83 96 
2004 31 20.39 100 65.79 21 13.82 152 
2005 24 44.44 14 25.93 16 29.63 54 
2006 25 23.36 60 56.07 22 20.56 107 
2007 29 18.95 113 73.86 11 7.19 153 
2008 12 12.90 77 82.80 4 4.30 93 
Total 137 16.63 566 68.69 121 14.68 824 
Source: Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX), Hong Kong Exchanges and 
Clearing Limited (HKEx), China Stock Market Trading Research 
Database (CSMAR). 
 
                                                 
4 Unless otherwise stated, throughout this thesis, only the issuance of ordinary share or GDR is 
discussed. 
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On the other way around, SGX is also heavily relying on business from China. As 
shown in Table 2, outside Singapore, SGX attracts half of its listing business from 
China till the end of 2008. Especially when the market turmoil was triggered by the 
credit crunch and spread all over the world in early 2008, the IPO activity at SGX 
from China was not cooled. Throughout the year, 12 out of 31 initial offerings at SGX 
were from China, accounting for 38.71% of the total listings and 50% of the listings 
in the mainboard (Table 3). The largest IPO of 2008 in terms of raised capital was a 
fabric and textile manufacturer from Fujian province of China, Li Heng Chem Fabre 
Tech.  
Table 2  Country distribution of listed companies at SGX (by the end of 2008)  
Total Main Board 
Origin Place N % N % 
Singapore 452 58.93 342 55.07 
Mainland China 151 19.69 135 21.74 
Southeast Asia 55 7.17 43 6.92 
Hong Kong 54 7.04 51 8.21 
Taiwan 19 2.48 17 2.74 
India 12 1.56 12 1.93 
Japan 10 1.30 10 1.61 
Europe 5 0.65 4 0.64 
Australia 3 0.39 2 0.32 
United States 3 0.39 3 0.48 
South Korea 2 0.26 1 0.16 
Israel 1 0.13 1 0.16 
Total 767 100.00 621 100.00 
Source: Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). 
 
Table 3  Country distribution of listed companies at SGX (2008 only)  
Total Main Board 
Origin Place N % N % 
Singapore 12 38.71 6 25.00 
Mainland China 12 38.71 12 50.00 
Southeat Asia 3 9.68 2 8.33 
Hong Kong 2 6.45 2 8.33 
India 2 6.45 2 8.33 
Total 31 100.00 24 100.00 
Source: Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). 
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Researchers have done a lot of valuable work regarding motives of overseas listing. 
The first major motive is to eliminate barriers for foreign investors (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2001), thus to widen shareholder base for risk sharing and capital cost 
reducing (Stulz, 1999; Martin and Rey, 2000). Barriers could be direct restrictions 
imposed by governments and information limitation possessed by foreign investors on 
domestic markets (Gehrig, 1993; Brennan and Cao, 1997; Kang and Stulz, 1997; 
Alexander et al., 1987).  
The other major motive for overseas listing is to pursue quality signal (Cantale, 1996; 
Stulz, 1999) and market liquidity (Ashbaugh, 2001; Reese and Weisbach, 2001) by 
following stricter listing standards and legal system compared with those in the firm’s 
origin country. In contrast, some other research claims that stricter listing standards 
require more information disclosure which would prevent private benefits from public 
share trading and keep potential listings away (Huddart et al, 1999). 
Other motives which have been studied mainly in empirical literature include (1) 
seeking foreign expertise who can evaluate the firm value effectively (Blass and 
Yafeh’s, 2000; Pagano et al., 2002; Fanto and Karmel, 1997); (2) capitalizing at low 
cost in the firm’s major products or operation markets (Saudagaran; 1988; Pagano et 
al., 1999); (3) strengthening the firm’s presence in strategic products market 
(Stoughton et al.; 2001; Radebaugh et al.,1995); (4) facilitating identification of 
potential merger or acquisition in foreign markets; (5) selling shares of existing 
shareholders (Bortolotti et al., 2000). 
However, earlier findings are so mixed that it is unfair to generalize conclusions on 
any true motives or features which finally lead to an overseas listing. Besides, most of 
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existing research chooses to focus on exchanges or firms from Europe or US, which 
have lots of differences from Asian countries, in terms of economic environment, 
market development and cultural background, which would present us with 
difficulties in applying those results without further study. Research scope is also 
quite limited to cross-listing, which means the firm they mostly studied has already 
listed on domestic market before it goes abroad, while it is not a common situation in 
China.  
Available studies focusing on Chinese firms are even fewer with most of them are 
only focusing on the privatization issue of Chinese state-owned firms. With increasing 
important role of private firms towards Chinese economy, we should pay more 
attention to behaviors and choices of private firms. Furthermore, many firms 
incorporate themselves on a country other than their home countries to evade revenue 
tax or to smooth their way of overseas listing, and almost none of previous research 
would count them as firms from their home countries even though their business is 
only conducted in the home country. This is an important issue for research on 
Chinese firms. For example, according to SGX, 151 listed companies are actually 
from China with only four of them were registered in mainland China. More than one 
third of these 151 firms were incorporated in Bermuda, and in some of the existing 
literatures (Sarkissian and Schill, 2009), tax havens like Bermuda are even cut off 
from their research scope even when they are studying on most extensive global 
market. 
We find that firms with better financial performance or better corporate governance 
prefer to have IPOs in Singapore other than Chinese domestic markets to separate 
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themselves from the rest as a quality signal to the capital markets and also to the 
product markets. However, the findings on the effects of financial performance on the 
choice between Singapore and Hong Kong are contrary with our expectations. Two 
potential explanations are proposed for future study. Industry sector, tax burden and 
firm size are also firms’ consideration to some extent. The external effects of a stock 
market’s performance seem not significant. Lastly, all of the testable variables fail to 
explain the location choice on Catalist5. Firms’ financial performances after IPOs are 
also examined, providing us information on whether the firms have achieved their 
perceived benefits from IPOs on that particular market. 
Following this introduction, section 2 gives a general review of the existing studies on 
the topic of overseas listing motives and effects on the firms’ performance. Section 3 
compares listing standards and legal environment between China’s domestic stock 
markets and Singapore’s market as well the market in Hong Kong. Our proposed 
hypotheses and econometric methodology are described in section 4, followed by the 
empirical results presented in section 5 and interpreted in section 6. Section 7 presents 
a description on those firms’ post listing performance, and section 8 concludes our 
investigation. 
 
                                                 
5 Catalist is a NASDAQ-type market for fast-growing companies, not requiring records of profitability 
as a condition of listing. At SGX, it is previously known as SESDAQ, and at HKEx, it is named as the 
Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). “Catalist” will be used hereafter to obtain consistency in 
terminology. 
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2. Literature review 
Selection of securities by investors is mainly restricted by their information awareness 
or availability. It is true for both direct investors and indirect investors who are 
involved through ownership or beneficial claims on institutional portfolios (Merton, 
1987). By expanding this incomplete information assumption to international equity 
investment, Gehrig (1993) explains the observation that domestic equities accounted 
for majority of investors’ portfolio, even when the effects of foreign exchange risk or 
transaction costs are controlled. Informational frictions are also discussed in Brennan 
and Cao (1997), Kang and Stulz (1997) and Alexander et al. (1987). By seeking 
overseas investors to widen its capital resources, firms are actively improving risk 
sharing and price discovering, thus to lower down the cost of capital. Stulz (1999) 
highlights the opportunity diversification and international market pressure firms and 
managers exposed to after listing overseas as a reason of lower risk premium thus 
lower required rate of return by investors. Martin and Rey (2000)’s model also 
predicts positive effects on asset price of cross-listing due to demand effects, which is 
supported by several empirical analyses on post-listing effects we will introduce later. 
Empirically, Bancel and Mittoo’s survey (2001) on managers of firms from six 
European countries proves that reducing information or transaction barriers to foreign 
investors is one of the major managerial perceptions for going overseas. 
According to Huddart et al (1999), individuals who possess the discretion to the 
listing location can make the decision for the benefit of security liquidity or for the 
benefit of insider trading. Thus the strictness of listing standards, mainly on 
information disclosure and corporate governance plays an important role to this 
 8
decision making process. By listing in a more strictly regulated system, potential 
insider information advantage is limited thus driving up the liquidity from risk-neutral 
liquidity traders (Huddart et al, 1999) and driving down the equity premium paid to 
this better legal institutions (Lombardo and Pagano, 2000). In addition, it is not 
unusual that firms choose to list abroad seeking high financial or operational quality 
reputation by adhering to stricter listing requirements (Cantale, 1996; Stulz, 1999). In 
contrast, by listing in a less strictly regulated system, insiders can have more 
information advantage to increase individual abnormal return, and at the same time 
the firm might have lower cost to maintain the qualified disclosure. Considerable 
empirical studies have argued on which effect overweighs the other. For example, 
findings in Ashbaugh (2001), Reese and Weisbach (2001) and Fanto and Karmel 
(1997) are in favor of liquidity seeking and quality signaling theories, while 
Saudagaran and Biddle (1992, 1995) and Radebaugh et al. (1995) stand at the 
opposite side. Because of the disparity of findings in the dominant effects, disputes 
about exchanges reaction exist, literally, racing to the bottom and racing to the top 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006). 
Markets barriers and listing standards are two major topics in existing research, 
especially in theoretical research. Other factors which affect firms’ listing decision are 
more discussed in empirical literature based on specific industries or regions the 
researchers are interested in. 
Firstly, firms in certain industry tend to seek foreign expertise who can evaluate the 
firm effectively. High-tech industries are the focus of related studies. Examples could 
be Blass and Yafeh’s (2001) research on Israeli and Dutch firms which choose 
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Nasdaq as the first listing location, and Pagano et al.’s (2002) study on European 
companies that cross-list in the United States. Managerial perceptions collected by 
Fanto and Karmel (1997) also support the hypothesis. 
Secondly, firms tend to capitalize in the market where they have high fraction of sales, 
especially in consumer products, utilizing their reputation in products or operation to 
raise capital at a lower cost. Saudagaran (1988) and Pagano et al. (1999) show that the 
extent of a firm’s dependency on foreign product markets is a significant factor 
influencing firms’ decision on listing location choice. Besides utilizing the existing 
foreign product markets to raise capital at low cost, overseas listing in turn could also 
serve as a strategy of strengthening the firm’s presence in foreign market, as studied 
by Stoughton et al. (2001) and Radebaugh et al. (1995) and evidenced by an anecdotal 
survey of Bancel and Mittoo (2001). 
Other purposes of overseas listing could be facilitating identification of potential 
merger or acquisition in foreign markets, and selling shares of existing shareholders 
which has a special case as privatization, a significant reason for most of Chinese 
SOEs to list their shares in Hong Kong (Huang, Wong and Zhang, 2007).  
In terms of location choice of going overseas, Sarkissian, Schill (2004) sample 2251 
listings which are from 44 countries and listed in 25 host markets as of 1998 and then 
find that risk tolerance of foreign investors and markets familiarity in terms of 
geographic, economic, cultural, industrial proximities are dominant concern in 
choosing the overseas market to list a firm. Portes and Rey (1999) and Tesar and 
Werner (1995) also support that firms tend to list on an exchange physically or 
culturally near to its origin country.  
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Over the past decades, researchers have examined the financial and operational 
performance of firms after their overseas listing based on different time horizons, 
regions or testing methods, to try to capture the general effects of overseas listing. The 
findings are mixed either on liquidity effects in both foreign and domestic markets, or 
on cost of capital and stock risk. For a general review on empirical research on 
consequences of cross-listings around the world, one can further refer to the surveys 
by Karolyi (1998, 2006). 
Recent studies also have mixed results. Analysis by Sarkissian and Schill (2008) on 
1256 listed firms from 35 countries on 24 host markets as of 1998 shows significant 
cost of capital reduction in the following five to ten years of listing. Jia, Sun and Tong 
(2005) examined 53 Chinese state-owned enterprises which were listed in Hong Kong 
in 1993-2002 and find a significant underperformance of share returns against 
benchmarks and a mild but insignificant improvement in profitability of those partial 
privatized firms. Ahmed et al.’s (2006) research on 134 Australian firms with 300 
listings listed between 1986 and 2000 also presents a decline in firm share returns 
after the cross-listings. Levine and Schmukler (2007) indicate that cross listing 
reduces the trading activity and liquidity in domestic markets by studying on 3000 
firms from 55 emerging economies, while Korczak and Bohl (2005) show a 
significant improvement in home market liquidity using cross listing in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
With regards to the methodology used in those empirical ex ante analysis, the list of 
related literature is summarized in Table 4. Accordingly, we choose the most 
popularly used econometric tool, logistic regression, in our analysis. Firm 
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characteristics will be our main independent variables and because we only have one 
origin place (mainland China) and three destination markets (Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Chinese domestic markets) in our analysis, features of the markets or the firms’ 
domicile are not suitable to be included as independent variables.  
Table 4  Methodology of related ex-ante analysis 
Literature Tool Independent Variable Research Topic 
Saudagaran (1988) Logit & OLS Firm characteristics US, Europe, Canada 
and Japan markets 
Biddle and Saudagaran (1995) Logit Firm characteristics & 
financial disclosure level 
of firms' domicile 
US markets 
Reese and Weisbach (2001) Logit Legal system of firms' 
domicile 
US markets 
Blas and Yafeh (2001) Probit Firm characteristics Israel firms on Israel 
and US markets 
Pagano et at. (2002) Cox Firm characteristics European and US 
firms and markets 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004)  Tobit Market features Global (without 
China) 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) Probit Firm characteristics Indonesian firms 
Huang, Wong and Zhang (2008) Logit & Cox  Firm characteristics Chinese SOEs 
 
 
Table 5  Summary of existing research on overseas listing 
  Motives Hypotheses Theoretical literature Ex ante evidence Empirical literature Ex post evidence Empirical literature 
Lower market beta, 
expected return and 
cost of capital 
+: Sarkissian and Schill, 2009; 
Foerster and Karolyi, 1999, 
2000;  
0: Karolyi, 1998, 2006 (survey); 
-: Jia, Sun and Tong, 2005; 
Ahmed et al., 2006 
Cheaper capital 





Increase in media 
coverage 





and sharing risk 
Liquidity 
improvement  
Merton, 1987; Gehrig, 
1993; Brennan and 
Cao, 1997; Kang and 
Stulz, 1997; Alexander 
et al., 1987; Stulz, 
1999; Martin and Rey, 
2000 






+: Bancel and Mittoo, 
2001 (M) 
  
Higher share turnover 
volume, turnover 
ratios; lower bid-ask 
spread  
+: Korczak and Bohl, 2005;  
0: Mittoo, 1997; Pulatkonak and 
Sofianos, 1999; Smith and 
Sofianos, 1997; 





Huddart et al., 1999; 
Lombardo and Pagano, 
2000 
Issue more equity 
after listing 









weak protection to 
minority 
shareholders 
+: Ashbaugh, 2001; 
Fanto and Karmel, 
1997 (M); Reese and 
Weisbach, 2001; 
-: Saudagaran and 
Biddle, 1992, 1995; 
Radebaugh, 1995 
Higher profitability  
3 Access to foreign 
expertise 
    High tech sector, 
large R&D 
spending 
+: Blass and Yafeh, 
2001; Pagano et al., 
2002; Fanto and 
Karmel, 1997 (M) 
Lower market beta, 
expected return and 
cost of capital 
  








+: Saudagaran, 1988; 
Fanto and Karmel, 
1997 (M); Pagano et 
at., 2002 
Higher profitability, 





Table 5 Summary of existing research on overseas listing (Continued) 
  Motives Hypotheses Theoretical literature Ex ante evidence Empirical literature Ex post evidence Empirical literature 





Stoughton et al., 2001 




listed in exchange 
+: Bancel and Mittoo, 
2001 (M) 
Higher foreign sales 
and profits 
+: Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 
1998; Pagano et al., 2002 








        Lower domestic E/P 







To use bidder's 
share as an 
acceptable 
currency 
          




market value of 
their shares 
      Higher share turnover   9 
Special case: 
privatization 
   Policy indication +: Huang, Wong and 
Zhang, 2008; 




+: Megginson et al., 2000 
-: Jia, Sun and Tong, 2005; 
Huang, Wong and Zhang, 2007 
Notes: 1. Under the columns of Empirical Literature, + denotes that the empirical result is consistent with the hypothesis; - denotes that the empirical result is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis; 0 denotes that the empirical result is mixed or insignificant. 
2. Literature followed by (M) means that the result is based on managerial perception. 
3. Legal environment and listing standards 
As indicated in existing literature, listing standards and legal systems in potential 
listing destinations do play an important role in a firm’s financing decision. We would 
firstly have a general review and comparison of the listing standards and legal 
systems among mainland China, Singapore and Hong Kong which is the biggest 
competitor in attracting IPOs from mainland China. 
The current legal framework in Singapore and Hong Kong are based on the English 
common law system. In contrast, legal system in the mainland China follows its 
German civil law origin. According to La Porta et al. (1998), investors generally have 
weaker legal rights, such as voting rights, in the civil law countries than in the 
common law countries. Hong Kong gets higher grades than Singapore in their 
research.  
La Porta et at. (1998) further finds that as a partial substitute to the weaker rights 
protection, the quality of law enforcement is generally higher with German civil laws. 
The substitute could also be mandatory dividends, legal reserve requirements, 
restriction on ownership concentration. However, as a developing country 
implementing gradualist reform approach, China has not established a strong law 
enforcement system to compensate the lack of legal rights protection. For example, 
China has an index on “Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights” equal to 5.16 
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by Gwartney et al. (2008)6, while this index is 8.43 for Hong Kong and 8.13 for 
Singapore. 
Thus, it is reasonable for Chinese companies to choose to list in Singapore and Hong 
Kong instead of mainland China, seeking higher liquidity and reputation, which is 
consistent with La Porta et al.’s (1997) finding. 
With the new Chinese Company Law coming into effect on 1 January 2006, Chinese 
regulators made efforts in improving the environment for capital markets. This new 
company law amends and creates regulations on shareholder rights protection. For 
example, the new version imposes shareholder the rights to request to dissolve the 
company with 10% approval of total shares under certain circumstances, while it is 
not allowed in the old version. The new version also imposes requirements on the 
independence of the accounting agency. One can refer to Gu (2006) for a detailed 
understanding on the changes. It should be expected to influence the pattern of listing 
locations of Chinese companies. 
With the information extracted from the websites of the four exchanges, Table 6 
presents us the current requirements and differences in listing standards of the markets. 
Generally speaking, requirements in Singapore and Hong Kong are much more 
flexible than in the mainland China, with different sets of criteria to satisfy needs or 
features of different firms. Despite their mature Catalists which could effectively 
satisfy the financing needs of medium and small enterprises, even their main boards 
                                                 
6 Source: Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson with Seth Norton (2008). Economic Freedom of the 
World: 2008 Annual Report. Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from 
www.freetheworld.com. 
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also have three sets of criteria. In Singapore, two of the three sets of criteria focus on 
testing firms’ profitability while another one focuses on market capitalization. Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange has one profit test, one combination test on market 
capitalization and revenue, and one combination test on market capitalization, revenue 
and cash flow. The standards are less adjustable in Shanghai and Shenzhen markets 
with one single set of criteria.  
The other aspect is that under each criterion the requirements in Singapore and Hong 
Kong are more stringent than those in Shanghai or Shenzhen. In terms of profitability, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen do not explicitly ask for a certain amount of profit or revenue, 
while Singapore requires cumulative pre-tax profit of at least S$7.5 million and Hong 
Kong requires profit contributable to shareholders of at least HK$50 million (S$9.29 
million)7 or revenue of at least HK$500 million (S$92.94 million) for the last 3 
consecutive years. 
In terms of cash flow, only Hong Kong requires positive cash flow from operating 
activities of at least HK$100 million (S$18.59 million) in aggregate for the 3 
preceding financial years under its Market Cap/Revenue/Cash Flow test, with no 
comparable requirements from Singapore, Shanghai or Shenzhen.  
The last important factor is related to a firm’s financial position. The required market 
capitalization in Singapore and Hong Kong are more than four times of those in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, with Hong Kong has the highest market capitalization 
requirement under its Market Cap/Revenue test. 
                                                 
7The exchange rate applied is the closing rate of January 2, 2009 cited from DataStream. 
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There is little difference in their required shareholder spreads, with a general 
requirement of 25% public holding. They also require a same length of operation 
tracking record as of minimum three years. 
Independent directors are believed to play a significant role in determining the 
effectiveness of corporate governance thus the value of a firm. Similar as the financial 
positions, Hong Kong has the most stringent requirement on the number of 
independent directors. Companies listed on HKEx must have at least three 
independent non-executive directors while SGX only requires two independent 
directors. Both Hong Kong and Singapore market ask for a sufficient management 
presence of the listed firms in the region, requiring one and two independent directors, 
respectively, to be their residents. 
Since 2000, SSE has suggested the listed firms appoint at least two independent 
directors and at least 20% of the entire board membership be independent directors, 
but they are not strictly required. In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) issued the Proposed Guidelines on Establishment of the System 
of Independent Directors in Limited Companies, which at the first time officially 
requires the number of independent directors should hired by listed companies. It 
requires that the firms should have at least two independent directors on the board by 
June 2002 and at least one third on the board by June 2003. However, given the weak 
enforcement of Chinese legal system, how effective is this Proposed Guideline is 
another concern that the public might have.  
Based on the above comparison, Hong Kong market has the highest and most 
stringent listing standards and legal environment, while mainland China has the least 
 18
 19
one and Singapore market is positioned in between. This finding together with the fact 
that Hong Kong is the most popular location of overseas listing by Chinese firms 
(Huang et al., 2007), could be an evidence for the hypothesis that firms choose to list 
overseas for quality and reputation signal by adhering to stringent requirements. 
Similarly, the stricter listing standards and legal environment should be a driven 
factor for firms choosing Singapore as their IPO location over Chinese domestic 
markets.  
Table 6  Comparison of listing standards in different markets 
 SGX China (SSE and SZSE) HKEx 








profit ≥ S$7.5 
million over 3 
consecutive years, 
with a pre-tax profit 
≥ S$1 million in each 






1 or 2 years 
NA Have made profits over 
3 consecutive years 
Good credit 




shareholders ≥  
HK$50 million 




for the most 
recent audited 
financial year 
Revenue ≥  
HK$500 million 
for the most 
recent audited 
financial year 




in aggregate for 3 
financial years  
NA 
Firm size NA NA Market cap 
≥ S$80 
million 





Market cap ≥  
HK$200 million 
Market cap ≥  
HK$2 billion 





25% of issued shares in the hands of at least 1000 
shareholders; 2000 shareholders worldwide in the 
case of a secondary listing 
Shareholders with 
holdings of values in 
excess of RMB1,000 ≥ 
1,000 persons 









Table 6  Comparison of listing standards in different markets (Continued) 
 SGX China (SSE and SZSE) HKEx 








For market capitalisation > S$300 million, 
shareholding spread will vary between 12-20% 
Publicly offered shares 
> 25% of total share 
capital. For total share 
capital exceeds 
RMB400 million, 
publicly offered shares 
must > 15% 
Minimum 25% 
public holding 
≥ 25% of total issued share capital must at all times be held 
by the public; 
The Exchange may, at its discretion, accept a lower 
percentage of between 15% and 25% in the case of issuers 
with an expected market capitalisation at the time of listing 
of over HK$10 billion 
Operating 
Track Record 
3 years NA  NA 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years 
Continuity of 
Management 
3 years 1 or 2 years  NA  NA NA  3 years 3 years 3 years 
Accounting 
Standard 
Singapore, US or International Accounting 
Standards 
 Chinese GAAP or International 
Accounting Standards 
Either Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards or 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
Directors At least 2 independent directors must be residents 
in Singapore 
At least 2 independent directors on the 
board by June 2002 and at least one third 
on the board by June 2003 
At least 3 independent non-executive directors, and one of 
them must be ordinarily resident in Hong Kong 
Source: Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX), Shanghai Sbtock Exchange (SSE), Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx). 
4. Hypotheses and data 
4.1.   Hypotheses and methodology 
4.1.1. Hypothesis I 
According to existing theoretical literature, we would like to test the hypothesis on the 
theory of quality signaling. We propose that firms with better financial performance, 
or better protection to minority shareholders, would like to choose to have IPO on a 
market with stricter listing standards and legal environment, to separate themselves 
from the rest, or the less good firms. We suppose that by doing so, those “good firms” 
wish to show their quality to the public on the stock market to raise capital at a lower 
cost, and also to show their quality to the public on the product market to raise their 
reputation. 
One of the basic indicators of financial performance is return on equity (ROE), which 
is net income divided by common equity. Generally, ROE tells us how well a firm is 
to generate profits using one dollar, but if we want to have more information on what 
the driven factor of the higher or lower ROE is, we need to look at its DuPont 
decomposition. Specifically, ROE could be decomposed as  
NI EBT EBIT Sales AssetsROE=
EBT EBIT Sales Assets Equity
    , 
where “NI” is net income after taxes, “EBT” is earnings before tax, “EBIT” is 
earnings before interest and tax, “Sales” is net sales, “Assets” is total assets, and 





The decomposition represents various fundamental financial ratios. NI/EBT captures 
a firm’s tax burden. EBT/EBIT captures a firm’s interest burden. EBIT/Sales is 
operating profit margin capturing a firm’s profitability. Sales/Assets is asset turnover 
rate capturing a firm’s efficiency at using its assets in generating sales or revenue. 
Assets/Equity is equal to (1+Debt/Equity), capturing a firm’s financial leverage which 
represents the firm’s risk or efficiency of current financial structure. 
To display the results more straightforward while not changing the interpretation, (1-
NI/EBT) is used hereafter instead of NI/EBT, as (1-NI/EBT) directly tells us how 
much the effective tax rate is. For the same reason, we use (1-EBT/EBIT) instead of 
EBT/EBIT to represent the interest burden. Once we include ROE decompositions as 
independent variables, as the product of these five factors, ROE would represent the 
interaction effects of these factors. 
According to quality signalling theory and the order of the strictness of listing 
standards at the four exchanges, we expect that firms with higher ROE, or higher 
operating profit margin (ie. EBIT/Sales) and higher asset turnover rate, prefer to list 
on HKEx than SGX, and prefer to list on SGX than SSE or SZSE. 
In terms of corporate governance, firstly, board independence is generally considered 
as an essential measure to evaluate the effectiveness of a firm’s protection to outside 
shareholders. We expect firms with higher percentage of independent directors on the 
board to be more likely to list on a stricter market. Secondly, the controlling status of 
state ownership is generally considered inefficient in tackling agency problem which 
impairs the firm value thus the interests of shareholders. Accordingly, firms with less 
state ownership are expected to have higher possibility to list on a stricter market as a 
quality signal. 
4.1.2. Hypothesis II 
We also propose that better market performance of an exchange encourages firms to 
list there, as firms would presume that they would also have similarly better 
performance on that market than on others. Thus, we expect that the higher the market 
index return, the higher probability a firm is going to choose this particular market 
than other markets. 
4.1.3. Control variables 
Firstly, “net sales” is added in as a variable to control firms’ size and also to check the 
effects of firm size. Secondly, we expect different industry sector display different 
patterns of preference in listing location choice, thus industry categories are included 
as control variables.  
4.1.4.  Methodology 
As one of the most popular econometric tools used by previous literature, logistic 
regression is applied in this paper. In particular, multinomial logistic regression is 
applied as our dependent variable is a dummy variable with three values, representing 
the three location choices respectively. Regression function is: 
log(P(choice=CH)/P(choice=SG)) = 1X β  





where “choice” denotes the IPO location choice. The reference case is always 
“choice=SG” throughout this paper.  
4.2.   Data 
Table 7 shows the distribution of listings from China in different periods at Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Chinese domestic markets. Chinese newly running stock 
exchanges were not opened until 1990, before which going overseas was their only 
choice of raising capital through public offering, but only a few companies were able 
and willing to do so.  
Along with the establishment of Chinese A share market in late 1990, B share market 
once was established for firms to raise capital from foreign investors, but the markets 
were too small to efficiently reflect firm value and since 2001 SSE and SZSE have 
stopped firms’ IPO activities on the B share market. This could be one of the reasons 
for firms’ actively seeking overseas listing or could also be the result of the flourish 
overseas listing which diminished the necessity of B shares. We can see from the 
table that after 2001 overseas listing increased dramatically compared with non-
increasing or decreasing domestic listing activities. Especially at SGX, more than 
90% of those listings from China happened after 2001. To eliminate the influence of 
B share market which is almost a history, and to capture the most up-to-date listing 
features, we will focus our analysis on the period between 2001 and 2008.  
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Table 7  Distribution of listings by listing periods 
 Total  CH'A'  CH'B'  HK  SG  
 N  %  N % N % N %  N  % 
<1990  22  1.01  0 0.00 0 0.00 20 8.23  2  1.32 
1990-2000  1282  59.08  1060 63.81 114 100.00 96 39.36  12  7.93 
2001-2008  866  39.91  601 36.18 0 0.00 128 52.46  137  90.73 
Total  2170  100.00  1661 100.00 114 100.00 244 100.00  151  100.00 
Source: Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX), Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
(HKEx), China Stock Market Trading Research Database (CSMAR). 
 
The lists of Chinese firms are provided by respective stock exchange and China Stock 
Market Trading Research Database (CSMAR). Industry category is based on 
FTSE/DJ Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) system and drawn from 
DataStream. Firms’ financial performances are drawn from financial statements 
available in DataStream.  
As firms’ financial statements are reported in different currencies as required by 
different stock exchanges or incorporation places, we try to use financial ratios rather 
than raw financial data in the analyses to avoid currency translation problem. But in 
cases of unavoidability of the use of raw data, we translate the reported currency into 
a common currency according to generally perceived way of international accounting, 
which is to apply average exchange rate of the year on income statement, and to apply 
exchange rate of the reporting date on balance sheet, except for the data on equity 
information such as raised capital of IPO activities where the historical exchange rate 
is applied. 
Corporate governance information for all firms at Chinese markets is collected from 
CSMAR, but only data after initial offerings are available. We consider certain 
features of corporate governance, such as the role of state sector and percentage of 
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independent directors to be consistent over years and not change significantly solely 
because of IPO. Corporate governance information for IPOs at SGX is hand collected 
from firms’ prospectuses but limited to a sub-group of our entire sample. 
The most popular referred indices are selected to capture the market performance, and 
they are available in DataStream. In particular, Singapore Straits Times Index, Hang 
Seng Price Index, and Shanghai SE Composite Index are used to represent the market 
performance of SGX, HKEx and Chinese domestic markets, respectively. As the 
performance of SSE and SZSE are highly correlated with each other, we would only 
consider SSE index return, if necessary, to avoid collinearity problem. 
 
5. Pre-IPO analysis 
5.1.   All IPOs included 
Summary statistics of key financial indicators one year before their IPO dates are 
described in Table 8, and Table 9 presents the mean differences among the three 
markets and their significances. On average, IPOs at SGX have the highest ROE, 
lowest tax burden, highest operating profit margin, highest asset turnover rate and 
smallest size. All these differences are significant compared with HKEx and Chinese 
domestic markets. Differences in interest burden and financial leverage are not 
significant. IPOs in Chinese domestic markets and Hong Kong market do not seem to 
be different, except higher ROE and larger size shown at HKEx. 
Table 8  Summary statistics: firm pre-IPO characteristics (all IPOs) 
Source: DataStream. 
Variables Market N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
SG 62 7.05 324.52 78.39 56.16
CH 395 2.45 73.89 24.10 11.51
ROE  
HK 69 2.68 299.82 36.63 44.14
Tax Burden SG 122 -20.68 64.30 11.70 12.96
 CH 527 -22.81 73.44 22.02 13.04
 HK 114 -16.70 342.86 24.72 35.76
Interest Burden SG 121 -201.30 538.57 1.47 54.13
 CH 518 -980.77 82.98 6.41 46.53
 HK 114 -3182.19 733.80 -35.17 317.01
SG 121 -25.95 67.87 25.20 13.88
CH 518 0.26 67.21 17.12 10.40
Operating Profit Margin  
 
HK 114 -678.88 67.95 12.92 67.23
Asset Turnover SG 122 10.82 840.73 135.84 113.39
 CH 527 3.56 788.64 95.33 61.58
 HK 114 2.81 748.94 87.34 81.34
SG 122 0.00 1283.07 104.06 165.68
CH 521 0.00 941.40 89.79 91.98
Debt/ Common Equity  
HK 115 -2.23 5119.78 148.80 494.32
SG 122 23.34 4625.84 495.38 711.93
CH 527 60.78 171997.40 1508.39 8468.66
NET SALES  
(million RMB) 
HK 114 2.44 171997.40 10802.61 26243.60
 
Table 9  Mean differences in firm pre-IPO characteristics (all IPOs) 
Notes: Independent sample T-test is applied. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
SG vs CH SG vs HK HK vs CH
Variables Mean Diff.  Mean Diff.  Mean Diff.  
ROE 54.30 *** 41.76 *** 12.54 ** 
Tax Burden -10.32 *** -13.02 *** 2.71  
Interest Burden -4.94  36.64  -41.58  
Operating Profit Margin 8.08 *** 12.28 * -4.20  
Asset Turnover 40.51 *** 48.50 *** -7.99  
Debt/ Common Equity 14.27 -44.74  59.01 
Net Sales (million RMB) -1013.00  -10307.23 *** 9294.23 *** 
 
Table 10 shows the distribution of all IPOs by industry. In terms of absolute number 
of listings, Chinese market has most companies in each sector, and Singapore attracts 
more firms in basic materials, consumer goods than Hong Kong does. In terms of 
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relative constitution of listings, basic materials, consumer goods and industrials 
account for the majority listings at SGX, while industrials and technology are the two 
major contributing industries at HKEx. Chinese market has relative more firms from 
industrials, basic materials and consumer goods sectors.  
Table 10  Distribution of IPOs by industry (all IPOs) 
 Source: DataStream. 
SG CH HK Total
Industry N  % N % N %  N  % 
Basic Materials 26 18.98 117 20.67 14 11.57 157 19.05
Consumer Goods 45 32.85 109 19.26 11 9.09 165 20.02
Consumer Service 2 1.46 21 3.71 10 8.26 33 4.00
Financials 6 4.38 22 3.89 12 9.92 40 4.85
Health Care 8 5.84 39 6.89 8 6.61 55 6.67
Industrials 29 21.17 191 33.75 39 32.23 259 31.43
Oil & Gas 6 4.38 7 1.24 6 4.96 19 2.31
Technology 11 8.03 42 7.42 17 14.05 70 8.50
Telecom  0  0.00 3 0.53 2 1.65 5 0.61
Utilities 4 2.92 15 2.65 2 1.65 21 2.55





Table 11  Logistic regression result: all IPOs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables  CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG 
ROE -0.066*** -0.025*** -0.071*** -0.011 -0.071*** -0.015* -0.073*** -0.017* -0.076*** -0.017* 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
Tax Burden   0.044*** 0.066*** 0.040*** 0.058*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 
   (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Interest Burden   0.001 -0.008* 0.001 -0.008* 0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Operating Profit Margin   -0.017 -0.041** -0.019 -0.039** -0.018 -0.040* -0.016 -0.036* 
   (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
Asset Turnover   0.007 -0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Leverage   -0.000  -0.002  -0.001  -0.005** -0.000  -0.005* 0.000  -0.004 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Net Sales     0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Industrials         0.588  0.218  0.839  0.437 
         (0.586)  (0.651)  (0.613)  (0.676) 
Consumer Goods         -0.497  -1.216* -0.378  -1.116 
         (0.565)  (0.678)  (0.566)  (0.681) 
Basic Materials         -0.087  -0.751  0.069  -0.536 
         (0.634)  (0.730)  (0.663)  (0.754) 
Tech         3.736** 3.139* 4.166** 3.478* 
         (1.875)  (1.899)  (1.992)  (2.000) 
Financials         -1.477  -1.178  -1.662  -1.036 




Table 11  Logistic regression result: all IPOs (Continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables  CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG 
SG Index Return                -0.197* -0.095 
                (0.101)  (0.116) 
HK Index Return                0.120 0.069 
                (0.097)  (0.111) 
SSE Index Return                0.003 -0.023 
                (0.019)  (0.022) 
Pseudo R-Square 0.185   0.252   0.286   0.313   0.342  
Obs. 526   521   521   521   521  
Notes: 1. Shown in parentheses are standard errors.  




Table 11 presents the logistic regressions on the choice of IPO location for the full 
sample. According to the result, (1) firms with higher ROE are more likely to choose 
to list in Singapore rather than Chinese domestic markets or Hong Kong. Though the 
comparison on ROE between SGX and HKEx is not as significant as the comparison 
between SGX and Chinese domestic markets, operating profit margin is also 
significantly higher for firms listed at SGX than those listed at HKEx, indicating 
higher profitability; (2) To reduce tax burden seems to be a very important motive for 
firms going to Singapore. The less tax paid as a percentage of EBT, the more likely a 
firm is to list on SGX; (3) Consistent with restrictions of listing standards and our 
impression from Table 9, firms with larger size have less probability to list on SGX; 
(4) Technology sector shows tendency to not list on SGX while other industry sectors 
do not have much preference on the IPO location; (5) Finally, the market index return 
is not that important as we predict in the hypothesis. These findings are interpreted in 
Section 6, together with findings from other models. 
5.2.   IPOs following the highest standards 
As described in Section 3, different exchanges have different listing standards, 
specifically, HKEx has the most stringent one and SSE and SZSE have the least one. 
SGX stands in between. Thus, one reasonable explanation for the firms’ different 
choices of IPO location would be that they just choose to list on an exchange 
wherever the firm’s feature can reach the listing standards. For example, a firm can 
only hit the standards of SSE and it needs capital through public offering, thus the 
result would be that this firm has its IPO on SSE but not HKEx or SGX. The result 
would not be the firm’s choice, but the exchange’s choice.  
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To eliminate the effect of listing standards, we set up another data sample constituted 
with firms satisfying the listing requirements of all of the four exchanges. As HKEx 
listing standards outweigh the standards of SGX, SSE and SZSE, at the final stage, 
the constraint on selecting sample for this dataset would simply be the HKEx listing 
standards8. At the same time, as only the listing requirements of mainboards are 
explicitly specified by exchanges, this dataset would be only applicable to the IPO 
choice on mainboards.  
As noticed, SGX has several amendments on its listing standards to improve the 
market efficiency and disclosure in the past few years, thus the choice made by firms 
under the older versions of listing standards might not be suitable to today’s situation. 
However, this dataset following the highest standards could also help us to eliminate 
this problem. 
Certain requirements restrict on financial performance two or three years before IPO. 
If the original data are not available to determine whether they could satisfy those 
requirements, projected data are used, under the assumption that certain financial 
ratios would be consistent over years.  
Only financial characteristics are considered when selecting firms satisfying the 
highest standards. Others such as requirement on number of independent directors are 
not considered, because it could be easily matched up with what is required as long as 
 
8 “HKEx standards” and “highest standards” are used interchangeably hereafter. For convenience, 
“HKEx standards” is used hereafter to represent the data sample following the highest standards in this 
section. 
the firm intentionally wants to follow that set of standards. It should not be considered 
as a constraint on firms’ IPO activities. 
Firstly, listing year distribution of those IPOs following the highest standards is 
shown in Table 12. By looking at the sudden diminished number of valid firms at 
SGX when we impose the HKEx standards (there are 137 firms in the full sample but 
only 33 firms left in this sample), we can further confirm that at least part of the 
firms’ IPO location choices are related by listing standards. Specifically, compared 
with HKEx, SGX is less strict, thus providing opportunities for firms with smaller 
size in terms of market capitalization or revenue, which are two major areas different 
in the standards between HKEx and SGX, to access to sophisticated international 
investors and capital. Nonetheless, increasing relative number of firms belonging to 
this “high quality” group went to SGX. In 2007 and 2008, the IPOs at SGX were even 
slightly more than IPOs at HKEx, though IPOs on both markets have dramatically 
decreased because of the recent financial crisis. 
Table 12  Distribution of IPOs by listing year (HKEx standards)9 
SG CH HK Total 
Year N  % N % N %  N  % 
2001 2 6.06 47 12.18 6 7.4 55 11.00
2002  0 0.00 40 10.36 6 7.4 46 9.20
2003 1 3.03 48 12.44 11 13.6 60 12.00
2004 4 12.12 69 17.88 12 14.8 85 17.00
2005 3 9.09 8 2.07 13 16.0 24 4.80
2006 7 21.21 43 11.14 19 23.5 69 13.80
2007 12 36.36 65 16.84 11 13.6 88 17.60
2008 4 12.12 66 17.10 3 3.7 73 14.60
Total 33 100.00 386 100.00 81 100.0 500 100.00
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9 With the highest standards applied, the sample is limited to companies listed in the mainboard only.  
The decrease in the number of firms on HKEx is caused by the drop of 40 firms on Catalyst. 
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Source: Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX), Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 
Limited (HKEx), China Stock Market Trading Research Database (CSMAR). 
 
Secondly, though separated from firms whose choice of IPO location are restricted by 
listing standards at different markets, descriptive statistics of the “high quality firms” 
as shown in Table 13 and Table 14 keep similar conclusions as the full sample, but 
with deviations. In particular, (1) average ROE is still highest in Singapore, and 
lowest in mainland China; (2) Tax burden is lightest but a bit heavier than the full 
sample in Singapore and heaviest in Hong Kong; (3) SGX still has the highest 
operating profit margin with the absolute number almost unchanged from the full 
sample, while operating profit margin at HKEx is much higher than its full sample 
largely because of the exclusion of IPOs on GEM; (4) Asset turnover ratio does not 
have much change in Hong Kong or mainland China compared with their full sample, 
but it increases in Singapore from 136% to 188%; (5) “High quality” firms listed in 
Singapore tend to use much lower financial leverage than its full sample, and tend to 
use the lowest leverage compared with others, showing their relatively conservatism, 
which may be a reflection of their conservative corporate governance. All in all, the 
descriptive statistics still show the similar general impression that Chinese IPOs at 
SGX have significantly higher profitability and efficiency, or better financial 
performance than other markets, prior to their IPOs. 
Table 13  Summary statistics: firm pre-IPO characteristics (HKEx standards) 
Source: DataStream. 
Variables Market N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
SG 17 24.37 195.95 82.86 47.20
CH 273 2.45 73.89 25.51 12.29
ROE  
HK 55 2.68 200.66 34.89 33.26
Tax Burden SG 33 -2.06 64.30 17.38 15.11
 CH 380 -22.81 67.45 21.54 12.98
 HK 78 -16.70 342.86 28.07 40.77
Interest Burden SG 33 -18.35 19.53 -0.75 7.08
 CH 374 -980.77 82.98 5.34 53.82
 HK 78 -592.16 733.80 1.04 114.34
SG 33 1.60 59.66 25.21 11.72Operating Profit Margin  
CH 374 0.26 67.21 17.40 11.15
 HK 78 -9.08 67.95 18.59 16.70
Asset Turnover SG 33 20.41 840.73 187.62 172.22
 CH 380 3.56 788.64 98.54 67.15
 HK 78 3.61 748.94 88.87 92.09
SG 33 0.00 362.11 62.72 87.67
CH 376 0.00 941.40 94.38 102.19
Debt/ Common Equity  
HK 79 -2.23 5119.78 171.31 581.01
SG 33 161.78 4625.84 1081.06 1120.00
CH 380 62.59 171997.40 1987.12 9934.21
NET SALES  
(million RMB) 




Table 14  Mean differences in firm pre-IPO characteristics (HKEx standards) 
Notes: Independent sample T-test is applied. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
SG vs CH SG vs HK HK vs CH
Variables Mean Diff. Sig. Mean Diff. Sig. Mean Diff. Sig.
ROE 57.35*** 47.97*** 9.39** 
Tax Burden -4.16* -10.69 6.53 
Interest Burden -6.10 -1.80 -4.30 
Operating Profit Margin 7.81*** 6.62** 1.19  
Asset Turnover 89.08*** 98.75*** -9.67 
Debt/ Common Equity -31.67* -108.59 76.92  
Net Sales (million RMB) -906.06  -14,601.83 *** 13,695.77 *** 
 
Thirdly, the general distribution pattern of high quality IPOs by industry is consistent 
with the one of the full sample. Furthermore, consistent with the low likelihood for a 
firm in technology sector to list on SGX shown in the regression with all IPOs 
included (Table 11), Table 15 shows that no firm in technology sector satisfying 
HKEx standards is willing to list on SGX. Thus, we would not include dummy 
“Tech” as a regression variable, as it would cause quasi-complete separation problem. 
Table 15  Distribution of IPOs by industry (HKEx standards) 
Source: DataStream. 
SG CH HK Total
Industry N  % N % N %  N  % 
Basic Materials 9 27.27 85 22.02 11 13.6 105 21.00
Consumer Goods 11 33.33 75 19.43 6 7.4 92 18.40
Consumer Service  0 0.00 13 3.37 7 8.6 20 4.00
Financials 4 12.12 18 4.66 12 14.8 34 6.80
Health Care 1 3.03 20 5.18  0 0.00 21 4.20
Industrials 6 18.18 126 32.64 29 35.8 161 32.20
Oil & Gas 2 6.06 7 1.81 5 6.2 14 2.80
Technology  0 0.00 27 6.99 7 8.6 34 6.80
Telecom  0 0.00 3 0.78 2 2.5 5 1.00
Utilities  0 0.00 12 3.11 2 2.5 14 2.80
Total 33 100.00 386 100.00 81 100.0 500 100.00
 
Regression results are presented in Table 16. After controlling the effects of listing 
standards, the most consistent finding with regressions in section 5.1 is the higher 
probability for firms with higher ROE to choose SGX other than other markets. 
Another similarity is the insignificance of market performance.  
Previously significant effects of concern on tax burden are not significant any more. 
Furthermore, firms with higher efficiency in generating sales by one unit of asset, 
measured by asset turnover rate, are less likely to list on SGX compared with Chinese 
domestic markets. The coefficient sign of asset turnover rate is the same for the 





Because of the control on firm size through restrictions of listing standards, “net 
sales” no longer has significant effects on the location choice. Lastly, besides the 
quasi-complete separating effect of technology sector, financial sector shows its 
preference to SGX over Chinese domestic markets. The findings are summarized and 
interpreted in Section 6.
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Table 16  Logistic regression result: IPOs following the highest standards (HKEx standards) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables  CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG 
ROE -0.062 *** -0.032*** -0.084*** -0.031* -0.090*** -0.044** -0.100*** -0.055** -0.109*** -0.058 ** 
 (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
Tax Burden  0.004 0.027 0.005 0.024 0.021 0.038 0.013 0.030 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Interest Burden  0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.005 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.001 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Operating Profit Margin  0.011 -0.028 0.014 -0.015 0.038 0.009 0.067 0.035 
  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
Asset Turnover  0.014** 0.001 0.016** 0.005 0.018** 0.009 0.021*** 0.011 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Leverage  0.006 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.014** 0.008 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Net Sales  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Industrials  0.319 0.574 1.241 1.328 
  (1.518)  (1.538)  (1.655)  (1.681) 
Consumer Goods  -1.951* -2.311* -1.992 -2.442 * 
  (1.145)  (1.207)  (1.231)  (1.299) 
Basic Materials  -2.075* -2.160* -1.792 -1.902 
  (1.164)  (1.219)  (1.213)  (1.273) 
Financials  -2.890** -2.098 -3.058** -2.223 




Table 16  Logistic regression result: IPOs following the highest standards (HKEx standards) (Continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables  CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG CH vs SG HK vs SG 
SG Index Return  -0.318* -0.117 
  (0.183)  (0.195) 
HK Index Return  0.255 0.111 
  (0.185)  (0.195) 
SSE Index Return  -0.040 -0.051 
 (0.035)  (0.038) 
Pseudo R-Square 0.131 0.199 0.242 0.272 0.319  
Obs. 345 343 343 343 343
Notes: 1. Shown in parentheses are standard errors.  




                                                
5.3.   Corporate governance 
We would like to further analyze the effects of corporate governance on firms’ listing 
decision. We would like to know whether SOEs and private firms have distinct 
preferences on listing location, and how the firms’ protection towards minority 
shareholders affects their decision. However, limited by the data availability, we can 
only work on a reduced sample which includes partial firms at SGX and all firms at 
Chinese domestic markets listed between 2001 and 2006. Besides the sample limit, 
corporate governance information for firms listed in China is only available after their 
IPO. Thus for Chinese markets, we use the reported data after but closest to the IPO 
date to capture their general corporate governance features, such as the percentage of 
independent directors on the board and whether the state is a significant influencing 
shareholder. Normally, these features would be consistent over years even with IPOs. 
The results are good enough for us to draw certain conclusions on our previous 
questions. 
Because we would only compare the listings between SGX and Chinese domestic 
markets and for the same reason of imposing HKEx listing standards to limit our 
research sample in Section 5.2, sample selection according to SGX standards is 
applied in this section10. 
As clearly shown in Table 17 and Table 18, IPOs following SGX listing standards 
have noticeably different patterns on corporate governance between the two markets. 
 




More than 90% of firms which chose SGX do not have state ownership at all, while 
the state sector has significant influence, with not less than 20% ownership, over the 
majority (57.22%) of firms which are listed on SSE or SZSE. On average, the state-
ownership of SGX (for firms from China) is 30.49 percentage points less than that of 
SSE and SZSE, while the independent director on the board is 16.86 percentage 
points higher than that of SSE and SZSE. 
Table 17  Distribution of IPOs by state-ownership 
SG (pre-IPO)  CH (post-IPO)  State 
Ownership  N % N %  
0%  35 94.59 109 30.88  
0%-5%  0 0.00 22 6.23  
5%-10%  0 0.00 10 2.83  
10%-20%  0 0.00 10 2.83  
20%-30%  1 2.70 15 4.25  
30%-40%  0 0.00 19 5.38  
40%-50%  0 0.00 17 4.82  
50%-60%  0 0.00 49 13.88  
60%-70%  0 0.00 71 20.11  
70%-80%  1 2.70 28 7.93  
>=80%  0 0.00 3 0.85  
Total  37 100.00 353 100.00  
Mean Diff.  
(SG-CH) -30.49***    





Table 18  Distribution of IPOs by percentage of independent directors on the board 
SG  CH  Percent of 
Indep. Director  N % N %  
0%-10%  0 0.00 55 15.58  
10%-20%  0 0.00 29 8.22  
20%-30%  4 10.81 34 9.63  
30%-40%  8 21.62 205 58.07  
40%-50%  11 29.73 27 7.65  
50%-60%  6 16.22 3 0.85  
>=60%  8 21.62 0 0.00  
Total  37 100.00 353 100.00  
Mean Diff.  
(SG-CH) 16.86***    
Source: Firms’ prospectus, and China Stock Market Trading Research 
Database (CSMAR). 
 
Regression results are presented in Table 19. Consistent with our impression from the 
descriptive statistics, state ownership (represented by a dummy variable which equals 
1 if the state ownership is no less than 20%) and percentage of independent director 
play significant role in determining the listing location choice between China and 
Singapore. It shows that firms with better corporate governance condition, in 
particular, higher independence of the board and less agency problem related to the 
state ownership, are more likely to list in Singapore than China. Besides corporate 
governance condition, consistent with our findings in Section 5.1, return on equity 
and tax burden are also determinant considerations. 
What different is the sign of the coefficient of consumer goods sector. In previous two 
sections, “Consumer Goods” has negative sign when comparing the choice of Chinese 
domestic markets with the market in Singapore, but it turns to be positive and 
significant in this section. “Basic materials” shows the same change in direction of 
preference, just insignificant. Other factors do not show significance. 
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Table 19  Logistic regression result: with corporate governance considered 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Variables CH vs SG  CH vs SG CH vs SG  CH vs SG  CH vs SG  CH vs SG  
State Owned >= 20% 3.153 *** 2.754 *** 1.245  2.428  6.096 ** 7.223 ** 
 (0.735)  (0.793)  (1.167)  (1.689)  (2.966)  (3.630)  
% of Indep. Director   -0.143 *** -0.150 ***  -0.184 *** -0.373 *** -0.462 *** 
   (0.026)  (0.039)  (0.055)  (0.123)  (0.179)  
ROE    -0.061 *** -0.111 ** -0.106  -0.139  
     (0.020)  (0.049)  (0.071)  (0.088)  
Tax Burden      0.082 ** 0.332 ** 0.349 ** 
       (0.042)  (0.139)  (0.143)  
Interest Burden       0.012  0.018  0.026  
       (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.025)  
Op. Profit Margin       0.012  0.001  0.049  
       (0.069)  (0.114)  (0.150)  
Turnover       0.052 * 0.044  0.052  
       (0.026)  (0.040)  (0.043)  
Leverage       0.005  0.010  0.015  
       (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.016)  
Net Sales       -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  
       (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Industrials        2.813  3.580 * 
         (1.796)  (2.089)  
Consumer Goods          9.033 ** 12.647 ** 
         (3.939)  (5.711)  
Basic Materials          1.426  2.296  
         (3.551)  (3.214)  
Tech         3.664  4.631  
         (2.799)  (3.647)  
Financials         -5.455  -4.113  
         (4.342)  (4.596)  
SSE Index Return            0.289  
           (0.232)  
Pseudo R-Square 0.173  0.375  0.578  0.721  0.821  0.838  
Obs. 390  390  323  319  319  319  
Notes: 1. Shown in parentheses are standard errors.  
2. Wald test is applied on the coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
One can, however, argues that prior to seeking for listing, companies would make 
sure that they satisfy the number of independent directors stipulated by the exchanges. 
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To tackle this potential selection bias, we further limit our sample to those companies 
satisfying the strictest requirement on the number of independent directors11. SGX 
and CSRC require that there should be at least two independent directors sitting on the 
board. Further, CSRC also requires that at least one third of the board be independent 
directors. The current requirement in China is not weaker than in Singapore, and since 
2003 most of new listings in China have satisfied the requirement. Using this more 
restrictive sample, we show in Table 20 that we obtain similar results. That is, 
companies with better corporate governance prefer to list on SGX than in Chinese 
domestic market. 
 
11 The place of residence of directors could not be quantified. 
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Table 20  Logistic regression result: with corporate governance considered (highest standards) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Variables CH vs SG  CH vs SG CH vs SG  CH vs SG  CH vs SG  CH vs SG  
State Owned >= 20% 3.359 *** 3.028 *** 1.199  4.805 *** 8.621 ** 8.831 *** 
 (0.752)  (0.868)  (1.550)  (1.862)  (3.401)  (3.409)  
% of Indep. Director   -0.165 *** -0.224 ***  -0.329 *** -0.522 *** -0.532 *** 
   (0.037)  (0.063)  (0.087)  (0.165)  (0.166)  
ROE    -0.078 **     
     (0.032)      
Tax Burden      0.143 *** 0.315 *** 0.327 *** 
       (0.042)  (0.116)  (0.120)  
Interest Burden       -0.009  -0.013  -0.013  
       (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
Op. Profit Margin       -0.165 *** -0.272 *** -0.267 *** 
       (0.055)  (0.103)  (0.100)  
Turnover       -0.021 ** -0.038 *** -0.039 *** 
       (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Leverage       -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
       (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Net Sales       -0.000  0.002  0.002  
       (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Industrials        2.369  2.789  
         (2.239)  (2.460)  
Consumer Goods          -1.760  -1.553  
         (1.958)  (1.943)  
Basic Materials          1.382  1.795  
         (2.962)  (3.002)  
Tech         2.984  3.560  
         (2.722)  (3.094)  
Financials         -11.653 ** -11.697 ** 
         (4.818)  (4.805)  
SSE Index Return            0.048  
           (0.099)  
Pseudo R-Square 0.254  0.437  0.712  0.725  0.814  0.816  
Obs. 172  172  111  165  165  165  
Notes: 1. Shown in parentheses are standard errors.  





5.4.   Catalist 
In Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, IPOs on Catalists (or GEM, the name used at HKEx) 
are excluded because exchanges generally do not explicitly impose any measurable 
criteria to IPOs on Catalists. We would like to examine the full sample of Catalists in 
this section. Chinese domestic markets did not have a similar type of market until 
2009, thus Chinese domestic market (CH) is not considered as an alternative choice in 
this section.  
Table 21 presents the number of IPOs on the two Catalists from 2001 to 2008.  
Table 21  Distribution of IPOs by listing year (Catalist) 
SG HK Total 
Year N % N % N %  
2001     5 12.5 5 9.26 
2002 1 7.1 10 25.0 11 20.37 
2003 1 7.1 9 22.5 10 18.52 
2004 4 28.6 9 22.5 13 24.07 
2005 5 35.7 3 7.5 8 14.81 
2006 2 14.3 3 7.5 5 9.26 
2007 1 7.1     1 1.85 
2008     1 2.5 1 1.85 
Total 14 100.0 40 100.0 54 100.00 
Source: Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX), Hong Kong Exchanges 
and Clearing Limited (HKEx) 
 
All of the testable variables are insignificant in various regression models, some of 
which are summarized in Table 22. 
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Table 22  Logistic regression result: Catalist 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Variables HK vs SG  HK vs SG HK vs SG  HK vs SG  HK vs SG  HK vs SG 
ROE  -0.005  0.015  0.021  0.019  0.016  0.012  
 (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.022)  
Tax Burden    0.093 * 0.065  0.062  0.273  0.047  
   (0.049)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.201)  (0.060)  
Interest Burden    0.023  0.016  0.023  0.012  0.025  
   (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.070)  (0.056)  (0.049)  
Op. Profit Margin    -0.024  -0.023  -0.023  0.005  -0.015  
   (0.055)  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.068)  (0.059)  
Turnover   -0.040  -0.054  -0.045  -0.112  -0.048  
   (0.025)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.081)  (0.037)  
Leverage    -0.007  -0.010  -0.010  0.012  -0.002  
   (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.014)  
Net Sales     0.004  0.003  0.008  0.004  
    (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.006)  
Industrials      -1.163     
      (1.712)     
Consumer Goods       -0.676     
       (1.942)     
HK Index Return         -0.507   
         (0.322)   
Sales Growth           -0.017  
           (0.020)  
Pseudo R-Square 0.015  0.358  0.372  0.388  0.641  0.396  
Obs. 23  23  23  23  23  23  
Notes: 1. Shown in parentheses are standard errors.  




6. Results summary and interpretation 
6.1.   Hypothesis I 
Return on Equity (ROE): ROE is consistently significant throughout the various 
regressions in the pre-IPO analysis (Section 5).  In particular, firms with higher ROE 
tend to list on SGX rather than on HKEx or SSE and SZSE.  
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Profitability and Efficiency: Through DuPont decomposition method (Table 23), we 
find that “asset turnover” and “operating profit margin” are two driven factors of the 
significant difference in ROE among different markets. The pre-IPO turnover rate and 
operating profit margin of firms on SGX are significantly higher than those on HKEx 
and Chinese domestic markets. This indicates higher profitability and efficiency for 
firms which would choose to list on SGX. 
The preference on SGX over SSE and SZSE for firms with higher ROE, in particular 
the part of higher ROE driven by higher operating profit margin and asset turnover 
rate, supports our proposed Hypothesis I, which states that firms with better financial 
performance tend to have IPO on a market with stricter listing standards and legal 
environment, to be separated from the rest as a quality signal. However, the 
preference on SGX over HKEx for firms with higher ROE seems contrary to 
Hypothesis I.   
Part of this preference on SGX over HKEx is attributable to the negative effect of 
stricter listing standards and legal environment, as illustrated by the findings in 
Saudagaran and Biddle (1992, 1995) and Radebaugh et al. (1995). The management 
team might have concern on the high degree of disclosure which would cause loss of 
insider information and their control power over the firm operation. The choice of 
listing location is made upon the consideration of both this negative effect and the 
quality signaling effect. In the case of comparison between SGX and HKEx, our 
findings in Section 5 are possibly telling us the dominance of the negative effect of 
stricter listing standards and legal environment. However, the negative effects of 
stricter listing standards are not directly tested in this thesis due to data availability. 
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Another possibility is that firms which go to SGX tend to inflate their ROE, or 
operating profit margin and asset turnover rate in particular, which is an assumption 
supported by the post-IPO analysis in the next section. The reason for this 
manipulation is worth a separate research in future.  
Corporate Governance: Consistent with Hypothesis I, firms with better corporate 
governance condition which means better protection to shareholders’ interests, and is 
indicated by less state ownership or higher percentage of independent directors on the 
board, are more likely to choose SGX rather than Chinese domestic markets, SSE or 
SZSE.  
Same as the first explanation to the preference on SGX over HKEx for firms with 
higher ROE, the preference on SGX over SSE or SZSE should also be considered as a 
balanced result of consideration on the two effects: quality signaling, and loss of 
insider information and control power. It is applicable to both financial and corporate 
governance conditions. The difference is that in the case of comparison between SGX 
and SSE or SZSE, the positive effect of stricter listing standards and legal 
environment dominates the negative one.  
Table 23  DuPont decomposition of ROE 
Notes: Independent sample T-test is applied. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
SG vs CH SG vs HK HK vs CH
Variables Mean Diff. Mean Diff. Mean Diff. 
All IPOs Included    
ROE 54.30*** 41.76*** 12.54** 
Tax Burden -10.32*** -13.02*** 2.71 
Interest Burden -4.94 36.64 -41.58 
Operating Profit Margin 8.08*** 12.28* -4.20 
Asset Turnover 40.51*** 48.50*** -7.99 
Debt/ Common Equity 14.27 -44.74  59.01
HKEx Standards       
ROE 57.35*** 47.97*** 9.39** 
Tax Burden -4.16* -10.69 6.53 
Interest Burden -6.10 -1.80 -4.30 
Operating Profit Margin 7.81*** 6.62** 1.19  
Asset Turnover 89.08*** 98.75*** -9.67 
Debt/ Common Equity -31.67* -108.59 76.92  
SGX Standards     
ROE 56.95***    
Tax Burden -10.48***    
Interest Burden -2.80    
Operating Profit Margin 8.68***    
Asset Turnover 43.56***    
Debt/ Common Equity 12.92   
 
6.2.   Hypothesis II 
Market Index Return: Hypothesis II proposed in Section 4 states that better market 
performance would encourage firms to list on that particular market. However, it is 
not apparently supported by the regression analyses in Section 5, with the signs of the 
coefficients consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis II but not showing the 





6.3.   Other variables 
Firm Size: in Section 5.1, the analysis with all IPOs included, firm size represented by 
net sales plays a certain role to the choice between SGX and HKEx: firms with larger 
size are less likely to list on SGX with other variables controlled. 
This observation is related to the different levels of restrictions from the two stock 
exchanges. As HKEx requires larger size of revenue and profit, firms which are 
unable to reach that level of requirement have to move to other markets, including 
SGX. Firm size would not be taken into consideration if the firm has the freedom to 
choose any market it wishes to list on, as shown by the insignificance of coefficient of 
net sales in Section 5.2. 
Tax Burden: As summarized in Table 23, prior to the listings, the mean differences in 
tax burden represented by (1-NI/EBT) between firms listed at SGX and HKEx and 
between firms listed at SGX and SSE or SZSE are 1% significant if all IPOs are 
included, but not significant anymore for those high quality firms which satisfy the 
HKEx listing standards at the time of going public. It keeps 1% significance level for 
the comparison between SGX and SSE or SZSE even under the SGX listing standards. 
Table 11 and Table 16 tell us exactly the same story on the significance of the effects 
of tax burden. 
Furthermore, we notice that firms which have IPO at SGX but originally come from 
mainland China are mostly incorporated in Singapore or other tax havens such as 
Bermuda (Table 24).  A further investigation in Table 25 shows that on average, tax 
burden for firms incorporated in Singapore or other places is significantly lower than 
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those incorporated in China, which is the major (sole) incorporation place for firms 
listed at HKEx (Chinese domestic markets). 
Therefore, we propose that, in order to take advantage of low tax burden, certain firms 
would like to incorporate in regions with low tax rate outside mainland China. By 
doing so, because of the limitation of IPO activities in mainland China where only 
accepts firms incorporated domestically (as shown in Table 24, though it is not 
explicitly stated in regulation rules), those firms incorporated outside mainland China 
could only seek to list on other markets.  
However, tax burden is a concern for high quality firms, thus the comparison between 
IPOs at SGX and HKEx, as indicated by the insignificant effects and the insignificant 
differences in Table 16 and Table 23. 
Table 24  Distribution of IPOs by incorporation place 
SG CH HK Total               List at 
Incorporate at N  % N % N %  N  % 
CHN 2 1.46 566 100.00 96 79.34 664 80.58
SGP 72 52.55         72 8.74
HKG         12 9.92 12 1.46
Others 63 45.99     13 10.74 76 9.22
Total 137 100.00 566 100.00 121 100.00 824 100.00
Source: DataStream. 
Notes: “Others” includes Bermuda, British, Cayman Island and British Virgin Islands. 
 
Table 25  Tax burden comparison by incorporation place 
  CHN  HKG Others SGP 
Mean   22.78 >  16.79 >  14.27 >  8.61  
Std. Dev.   18.86  18.97  14.20  10.09  
CHN  5.99  8.51 ***  14.17 ***  Mean Diff. 
HKG    2.52  8.18  
Notes: Independent sample T-test is applied. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 




                                                
Industry: Consistently throughout Section 5, technology sector shows tendency of not 
listing on SGX, but financial sector shows the opposite tendency. Cautions are 
required when interpreting the regression result on financial sector, as the dual listings 
on HKEx and SSE of three mega banks12 are excluded from the analyses in Section 5 
to reflect the IPO location preference when firms could only choose one market. 
Actually, all of the financial firms listed at SGX specialize in “real estate investment 
and services”. Thus, we assume that it is the sub-sector of “real estate investment and 
services” which has the tendency to choose Singapore, possibly for the purpose of 
taking advantage of foreign expertise from SGX in evaluating financials. 
Consumer goods sector is another industry dummy with significant effect on the 
listing location choice. When corporate governance condition is not considered, 
“Consumer Goods” has negative sign, which means preference for SGX over other 
markets, but it turns to be positive in Section 5.3 with corporate governance condition 
controlled. Because consumer goods industry is generally in private sector with little 
state ownership involved, the negative sign of consumer goods industry in previous 
two sections may simply be a reflection of the effects of state ownership rather than 
the effects of the industry itself. In other words, when firms in consumer goods 
industry show higher likelihood to list on SGX compared with SSE and SZSE, the 
driven factor might be the less involvement of state sector in this industry. 
 
12 Dual listings on HKEx and SSE excluded from the analysis are: Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, Bank of China, China Citic Bank Corporation and China Railway Group. Only China Railway 
Group is not in financial industry. 
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Therefore, regression in Section 5.3 with the effect of state ownership controlled, tells 
us the true effects of consumer goods sector on the listing location choice. The same 
argument could be applied to explain the change of sign (from negative in Section 5.1 
and Section 5.2 to positive in Section 5.3) of the coefficient of “Basic Materials”, 
though it is generally not significant.  
Possible explanation to the preference for Chinese domestic markets over SGX shown 
by consumer goods sector (Table 19 in Section 5.3) is related to the interaction 
between capital market and output market. As long as the principle business of those 
firms in consumer goods sector is in mainland China (which is almost true according 
to the information provided by the exchanges), they would tend to list domestically to 
capitalize with low cost by utilizing their product or operation reputation (Fanto and 
Karmel, 1997), or to strengthen their reputation on the output market through IPO 
activities (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001). 
6.4.   Catalist 
All of the testable variables are insignificant in various regression models. Before 
2004, the number of listings at Hong Kong by Chinese firms are much more than 
those at Singapore, however, since 2005, the number of new listings at Singapore by 
Chinese firms has been exactly the same as new listing at Hong Kong (Table 21). The 
change of trends in number of listings at the two markets is possibly telling us that the 
previous preference for Hong Kong shown by Chinese firms might be simply caused 
by the location or culture proximity, but with the deepening of globalization, Hong 
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Kong might lose the distinct advantage in attracting firms from mainland China, at 
least on the Catalists. 
 
7. Post-IPO analysis 
In this section, we would like to investigate the firms’ financial performance after 
they go public on one of the three markets, to examine whether their choices of listing 
location have helped them in the firms’ operation. Table 26 presents the paired 
difference in various financial performance indicators of a firm in three years time 
after its IPO compared with its performance prior to the IPO. 
Consistent with prediction of financial theories, return on equity (ROE) and financial 
leverage (total debt/ common equity) decrease due to the equity raising activity 
through IPO; tax burden and interest burden do not change much; net sales increase 
but not as fast as the increase in asset (shown as the decrease in asset turnover rates) 
due to diminishing marginal productivity of capital. 
Though all firms experience decrease in ROE and asset turnover after going public, 
the magnitude of decreases at different markets are not the same. ROE and asset 
turnover at SGX show the largest decrease among the three regional markets with 
almost more than two times of the magnitude in other markets. The decreases in ROE 
and asset turnover rate are so large that we cannot exclude the possibility of 
intentional inflation in certain financial data for Chinese firms at SGX. It serves as a 
supporting fact of one of the explanations to the pre-IPO analysis result on the 
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comparison between SGX and HKEx, which is contradict to Hypothesis I. However, 
this argument needs further justification. 
Our focus is on the change of firms’ profitability (operating profit margin), which 
shows the most distinct difference among the three markets (the second category in 
Table 26). Operating profit margin for firms at Chinese domestic markets consistently 
decrease significantly through the two years compared with the year before a firm’s 
IPO. The ratio also decreases significantly at Singapore market but insignificantly for 
those high quality firms which satisfy HKEx listing standards at the time of their IPOs. 
Chinese firms at Hong Kong market perform much better than the other two markets: 
operating profit margin decreases after one year of a firm’s IPO but never 
significantly and it even increases in the year of a firm’s IPO compared with the ratio 
before its IPO. 
To sum up, Chinese firms at HKEx show the most favorable change in post-IPO 
profitability and the changes for firms at SGX and Chinese domestic market are 
almost comparable, but better for those high quality firms at SGX. 
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Table 26  Changes in financial performance after IPO  
 SG CH HK 
Sample Financial Year Paired Diff. Paired Diff. Paired Diff. 
ROE (NI/Common Equity) 
Y=0 -47.03 *** -10.86 *** -18.16 *** 
Y=1 -61.47 *** -15.33 *** -28.40 *** 
All IPOs 
Y=2 -44.30 *** -23.94 *** -26.54 *** 
Y=0 -44.11 *** -11.35 *** -15.82 *** 
Y=1 -54.42 ** -15.71 *** -26.75 *** 
HKEx Standards
Y=2 -21.95  -22.21 *** -22.31 *** 
Y=0 -48.81 *** -10.95 *** -15.82 *** 
Y=1 -59.33 *** -15.37 *** -26.75 *** 
SGX Standards 
Y=2 -55.84 *** -24.23 *** -22.31 *** 
Y=0 -36.99 **   -26.87  
Y=1 -71.13 **   -34.36  
Catalist 
Y=2 -11.61       -38.19   
Operating Profit Margin (EBIT/Net Sales) 
Y=0 -3.79 ** -1.96 *** 2.31  
Y=1 -8.54 *** -6.32 *** -5.38  
All IPOs 
Y=2 -7.71 *** -8.42 *** -5.16  
Y=0 -0.82  -1.77 *** 0.46  
Y=1 -6.58  -5.36 *** -2.29  
HKEx Standards
Y=2 -3.67  -7.91 *** -2.29  
Y=0 -3.48 ** -1.89 *** 0.46  
Y=1 -8.08 *** -6.19 *** -2.29  
SGX Standards 
Y=2 -6.99 *** -7.95 *** -2.29  
Y=0 -6.25 **   6.15  
Y=1 -11.45 **   -11.66  
Catalist 
Y=2 -11.85 ***     -10.00   
Tax Burden (1-NI/EBT) 
Y=0 -0.66  1.02  -6.82  
Y=1 -0.18  -1.41  -2.59  
All IPOs 
Y=2 -1.33  -10.68  -2.52  
Y=0 -2.56  -0.40  -11.79  
Y=1 -9.05  -2.27  -4.96  
HKEx Standards
Y=2 -4.13  -14.8  -9.08  
Y=0 -0.68  1.32  -11.79  
Y=1 -1.97  -1.29  -4.96  
SGX Standards 
Y=2 -1.40  -10.53  -9.08  
Y=0 -0.49    3.53  
Y=1 11.73    2.09  
Catalist 




Table 26  Changes in financial performance after IPO (Continued) 
 SG CH HK 
Sample Financial Year Paired Diff. Paired Diff. Paired Diff. 
Interest Burden (1-EBT/EBIT) 
Y=0 -15.20  -1.10  -0.50  
Y=1 -39.24  0.83  -1.21  
All IPOs 
Y=2 4.79  6.44  46.89  
Y=0 -2.78  -1.17  -51.35  
Y=1 -14.10  -0.14  -29.12  
HKEx Standards
Y=2 -3.24  12.89  -9.98  
Y=0 -4.15  -0.91  -51.35  
Y=1 5.11  4.21  -29.12  
SGX Standards 
Y=2 -6.26  7.39  -9.98  
Y=0 -102.70    105.44  
Y=1 -327.49    55.45  
Catalist 
Y=2 68.89       139.94   
Asset Turnover (Net Sales/Total Asset) 
Y=0 -46.89 *** -30.23 *** -18.36 *** 
Y=1 -39.64 *** -27.94 *** -20.01 *** 
All IPOs 
Y=2 -51.50 *** -26.96 *** -19.65 *** 
Y=0 -79.83 *** -31.02 *** -17.64 *** 
Y=1 -76.45 *** -30.03 *** -21.87 *** 
HKEx Standards
Y=2 -102.90 ** -28.53 *** -22.83 ** 
Y=0 -50.44 *** -30.05 *** -17.64 *** 
Y=1 -43.79 *** -28.14 *** -21.87 *** 
SGX Standards 
Y=2 -58.82 *** -27.19 *** -22.83 ** 
Y=0 -18.49 *   -19.85 *** 
Y=1 -11.96    -16.35 *** 
Catalist 
Y=2 -9.07       -14.50 ** 
Total Debt / Common Equity 
Y=0 -78.78 *** -48.98 *** -110.04 ** 
Y=1 -36.16 * -33.67 *** -89.80 * 
All IPOs 
Y=2 -35.78 * -21.59 *** -100.29 * 
Y=0 -53.99 *** -51.22 *** -130.12 * 
Y=1 -31.77  -37.04 *** -105.60  
HKEx Standards
Y=2 -1.21  -22.29 *** -132.09  
Y=0 -84.28 *** -49.50 *** -130.12 * 
Y=1 -58.62 *** -34.13 *** -105.60  
SGX Standards 
Y=2 -39.37 * -21.47 *** -132.09  
Y=0 -35.18    -67.66 ** 
Y=1 109.83    -58.22  
Catalist 




Table 26  Changes in financial performance after IPO (Continued) 
 SG CH HK 
Sample Financial Year Paired Diff. Paired Diff. Paired Diff. 
Net Sales (milllion RMB) 
Y=0 140.49 *** 351.36 *** 1627.20 *** 
Y=1 365.51 *** 630.62 *** 3995.92 *** 
All IPOs 
Y=2 577.15 *** 969.47 *** 7925.03 *** 
Y=0 292.79 *** 475.06 *** 2365.94 *** 
Y=1 698.22 *** 835.10 *** 5952.27 *** 
HKEx Standards
Y=2 1493.13 ** 1291.86 *** 12538.19 *** 
Y=0 150.94 *** 367.82 *** 2365.94 *** 
Y=1 388.52 *** 657.33 *** 5952.27 *** 
SGX Standards 
Y=2 645.33 *** 1016.65 *** 12538.19 *** 
Y=0 56.85 **   88.15 *** 
Y=1 214.08 *   139.11 *** 
Catalist 
Y=2 188.51       236.44 ** 
Notes: 1. Y=0, 1, 2 refer to a firm’s financial report in the year of its IPO, one year after its 
IPO, two years after its IPO, respectively. 
2. Paired mean difference T-test is applied. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
3. One extreme case at SGX is excluded from the sample of “All IPOs” and “SGX Standards” 
for Y=1 and Y=2 because extremely large amount of non-operating profit is reported. Due to 
the same reason, one extreme case at HKEx is excluded from the sample of “All IPOs” and 




This thesis looks at the determinant factors to the IPO location choice of Chinese 
firms, in particular, the location preference between the Singapore market and the 
market in Hong Kong or in mainland China. 
8.1.   Major findings 
First of all, firms with less net sales are more likely to list on SGX than HKEx with 
other firm characteristics controlled; however, this preference is attributable to the 
requirement of HKEx on a larger size of revenue and profit. When the direct effects of 
different listing standards at different exchanges are controlled by reducing the 
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sample to those firms which satisfy the highest listing standards (HKEx standards) at 
the time of their IPOs, net sales is no longer a determinant factor. 
Even with the freedom to choose any market a firm wishes to list on, which means the 
listing standards at any market are not binding at all, the firm still has preference on a 
particular market according to its characteristics in financial performance and 
corporate governance. 
According to quality signaling theory, we should expect that firms with better 
financial performance or corporate governance prefer to list on HKEx than SGX, and 
least prefer to list on SSE or SZSE, to separate themselves from the rest as a quality 
signal to the capital markets and also the product markets. As predicted, we find that 
firms with higher return on equity which is driven by a higher profitability or 
operating efficiency, or firms with better corporate governance conditions indicated 
by less state ownership and higher percentage of independent directors on the board, 
do show preferences to have IPOs on SGX over SSE or SZSE.  
However, the findings on the effects of return on equity to the choice between SGX 
and HKEx are contrary with our expectations. It can possibly be explained by the 
overweighing of negative effects of a stricter market, such as management team’s 
concern on the loss of insider information and control power, and the higher monetary 
cost of listing (Saudagaran and Biddle, 1992, 1995). Another explanation is related to 
the prevailing practice of financial reporting under different levels of regulatory 




We also find that tax burden is one of the major considerations for firms to make the 
IPO location choice, thus related to the incorporation place. In particular, firms which 
wish to lower down its tax burden by incorporating at Singapore or Bermuda, tend to 
list at Singapore rather than other markets. It is not a consideration for those high 
quality firms. 
In addition, the industry sector a firm belongs to is also a determinant factor. 
Technology sector shows the tendency of listing at HKEx, and the financial firms 
specializing in “real estate investment and services” show the tendency of listing at 
SGX, possibly for the purpose of taking advantage of foreign expertise at the 
particular market in evaluating that particular industry sector. Furthermore, with the 
control in state ownership, consumer goods sector prefers to list domestically (SSE or 
SZSE) to interact with its product markets. 
The external effects from the stock market’s performance seem not significantly 
affecting firms’ IPO location choice. 
Lastly, all of the testable variables fail to explain firms’ IPO location choice between 
the two Catalists. The change of trends in number of listings at the two Catalists 
(more firms begin to list on SGX) is possibly telling us that the previous preference 
for Hong Kong shown by Chinese firms might be simply explained by the location or 
culture proximity, but with the deepening of globalization, Hong Kong might lose that 
distinct advantage in attracting firms from mainland China. 
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8.2.   For further studies 
As stated above, our empirical analysis presents a contradict finding with the 
theoretical hypothesis in terms of the preference between HKEx and SGX for firms 
with better financial performance. The two potential explanations related to the 
negative effects of stricter listing standards and the practice of financial reporting or 
any other possible explanations deserve further investigation.  
Furthermore, limited by data availability, we have only tested the effects of market 
index return as a proxy to the overall market performance, based on which we 
conclude that external factor is not important for firms to make the IPO location 
choice. However, there should be other better proxies to the market performance 
relating to the IPO location choice or better proxy to the external effects to be 
considered. 
Our post-IPO analysis is limited to only two years after a firm’s public offering 
because most of the IPOs in our sample happened in very recent years. However, it is 
argued that certain effects of the public offering could only be reflected in a longer 
term, thus requiring further studies in future. 
In addition, the new Chinese Company Law coming into effect on 1 January 2006 
should be expected to influence the pattern of listing location choice of Chinese 
companies in future, which might not have been reflected in our available IPO sample. 
This new company law amended the old version and also created new regulations on 
shareholder rights protection. One can refer to Gu (2006) for a detailed understanding 
on the changes. 
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At last, with the reopening of SZSE in January 2009, it begins to focus on the markets 
for high growth and high-tech start-ups, to transform itself into a NASDAQ-type 
exchange. This action is also expected to have effects on the pattern of listing location 
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